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This box presents the Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic 
projections, updating those published on 7 June.1 The new projections 
include the information that has come to light between 18 May and 
23 September, the respective cut-off dates for the previous and current 
exercises (see Table 1).2 One specific and significant change arises in 
the latest Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) estimates, which include 
the data for the first two quarters of 2016 (these were not available at 
the time the projections published in June were prepared).3
The estimates point to the continuation throughout the projection 
period of the expansionary phase of the Spanish economy. This 
development will be assisted by a series of different factors, 
including some that have conferred a high degree of sustainability 
on the expansion (including most notably the correction, over 
recent years, of imbalances such as the loss of external 
competitiveness), along with others that entail a greater or lesser 
degree of temporariness, such as the improvements in resident 
agents’ financial conditions, largely supported by monetary policy 
conduct, the expansionary fiscal policy stance applied in the two 
years spanning 2015-2016 and the delayed effects of the recently 
observed fall in oil prices and depreciation of the euro. Specifically, 
it is estimated that GDP will grow by 3.2% this year, slowing to 
2.3% and 2.1% in 2017 and 2018, respectively (see Table 2), as a 
result of the disappearance of a significant portion of the 
temporary impulses listed. Turning to consumer prices, after 
posting a fall of -0.3% in 2016 on average, they are expected to 
rise to 1.5% and 1.6% in each of the next two years, driven by 
higher oil prices and by the progressive reduction in cyclical 
slack.
The main change from the June to the September exercise in 
the assumptions underlying the projections is the downward 
revision in the expected rate of expansion of the Spanish 
economy’s external markets. This is chiefly a consequence of 
the estimated impact on UK imports arising from this country’s 
referendum to remain in or exit the European Union and, to a 
lesser extent, of a downward reassessment of the growth rate 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018
International environment
0.01.0-0.05.33.39.20.3tuptuo dlroW    
3.0-6.0-7.0-9.33.38.19.1stekram dlroW    
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Monetary and financial conditions
20.0-20.0-10.0-21.121.121.111.1)orue rep DSU( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
    Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the non-euro area
    countries (c) (2000=100 and pp changes) 113.0 114.2 114.8 114.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7
1.0-0.00.04.0-3.0-3.0-0.0)b( )robiruE htnom-3( setar tseretni mret-trohS    
8.0-7.0-3.0-5.13.13.17.1)b( )sdleiy dnob raey-01( setar tseretni mret-gnoL    
September 2016 projection
Changes from the June 2016 
projection
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Assumptions cut-off date: 19 September 2016. Figures in levels are annual averages and the percentage rates are calculated on the basis of the related 
annuaaverages.
b For the projection period, the values in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions are based on 
the prices on futures markets or on approximations thereto, and they should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem forecast about the course of these variables.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
1  Available in this link.
2  The respective cut-off dates for information-gathering in respect of the 
assumptions are 10 May and 19 September, except in the case of 
developments in Spain’s export markets, for which the assumptions for 
the current exercise are taken from the September 2016 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area, produced by ECB staff 
members, whose cut-off date is 15 August. 
3  INE has also published in September a revision of the Annual National 
Accounts series for the period 2012-2015, which revises downwards the real 
GDP growth rate for the first of these years and leaves the rest unchanged, 
and it sets out, in cumulative terms, a higher contribution of external demand 
to GDP growth (at the expense of less robust national demand). These 
annual series have not been used for the preparation of the current 
projections, given that the methodology employed requires the use of 
quarterly series and INE will not disclose the series with this frequency 
consistent with the annual data now published until 24 November.
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of world trade.4 Moreover, compared with the June forecasts, a 
somewhat higher level of oil prices is projected, in line with the 
observed trend on the spot and futures markets for this 
commodity. It is further estimated that competitors’ prices will 
grow somewhat less than expected three months ago, despite 
the slight depreciation of the euro since then. Finally, there will 
be a further reduction in the cost of credit financing to 
households and non-financial corporations, prompted by the 
downward revision of the expected interest-rate paths on 
interbank and government debt markets, according to the 
expectations implied in the yield curve. Moreover, in the case of 
firms a reduction in the cost of financing received via securities 
issues is included, which reflects in part the effects of the 
launch of the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) by 
the ECB (see Box 4).
The fiscal policy assumptions for 2016 rest on the measures 
approved in the budgets of the different tiers of government for 
this year, as in June, and on the budget outturn figures available. 
However, none of the further measures announced have been 
included, such as that relating to the re-establishment of minimum 
amounts for corporate income tax prepayments, given the failure 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018) (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure: 2016 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 23.09.2016.
b Difference, to one decimal place, between GDP growth and the contribution of net external demand.
c Excludes aid to financial institutions.
September 2016 projection
Changes from the June 2016 
projection
2015 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018
0.00.04.01.23.22.32.3PDG
0.02.04.05.10.24.31.3noitpmusnoc etavirP
1.01.0-1.0-8.08.00.17.2noitpmusnoc tnemnrevoG
4.0-7.0-7.0-5.48.40.44.6noitamrof latipac dexif ssorG
0.1-5.0-2.0-7.56.69.72.01tnempiuqe ni tnemtsevnI    
2.0-2.1-3.1-4.42.41.23.5noitcurtsnoc ni tnemtsevnI    
2.0-3.0-9.08.45.43.54.5secivres dna sdoog fo stropxE
4.0-6.0-1.09.49.44.55.7secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI
National demand (contribution to growth) (b) 3.7 3.1 2.3 2.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Net external demand (contribution to growth) -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
1.0-0.03.07.33.35.38.3PDG lanimoN
1.0-0.01.0-6.11.13.06.0rotalfed PDG
1.0-1.03.06.15.13.0-5.0-)IPC( xedni ecirp remusnoC
CPI excl. energy and unprocessed food prices 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 -0.1
0.00.04.08.10.29.20.3)stnelaviuqe emit-lluf( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (% of labour force)
End-of-period data 20.9 19.0 17.8 16.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.6
Unemployment rate (% of labour force)
Average data 22.1 19.8 18.3 17.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6
Net lending (+)/net borrowing (–) of the nation (% of GDP) 2.1 2.6 2.2 1.9 0.6 0.7 0.7
General government net lending (+)/net borrowing (–)  
(% of GDP) (c) -5.0 -4.9 -3.6 -3.1 -0.8 -0.2 -0.2
Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACRO-MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
4  In the projections for the United Kingdom it is assumed that the 
referendum outcome will give rise to a significant downward revision of 
household and business spending, as a prolonged stage of uncertainty 
commences. This reduction in demand, along with the depreciation of 
sterling, will prompt a significant decline in British imports, which affects 
Spanish exports (along with the second-round effects via third markets). 
Following the referendum, a notable downward revision has been 
observed in the expected path of long-term interest rates which, in part, 
might be related to the referendum result, in so far as it reflects 
expectations of monetary policy easing. For further details on the way in 
which the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU impacts the projections for 
Spain and for the rest of the euro area, see Box 1 in September 2016 
ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. 
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to specify such amounts at the time these forecasts were 
formulated (see Box 2). With regard to 2017 and 2018, the fact that 
the preparatory cycle for the budgets of the different tiers of 
government has not been set in train means that there is a high 
degree of uncertainty about how budgetary policy will be 
specifically formulated. Against this background, it has been 
decided to prepare a scenario that involves assuming a neutral 
fiscal policy stance. Specifically, it is assumed that budget items 
subject to a greater degree of discretionality (e.g. inputs or public 
investment) will move in line with the (nominal) trend growth 
projections for the economy. Notwithstanding this assumption, the 
forecast for public revenues and the dynamics underlying certain 
expenditure items, such as that earmarked for the payment of 
unemployment benefits, are derived from the forecast 
macroeconomic aggregates. In-house estimates are also made of 
demographic trends, with an impact on pension spending, and of 
the debt interest burden. The fiscal policy stance derived from the 
projections in this report is expansionary in 2016 (for which year a 
deterioration in the primary structural balance of close to 1 pp of 
GDP is estimated, similar to that estimated for 2015) and, in 
accordance with the foregoing criterion, it is neutral in 2017-18. 
Compared with the projections published over three months back, 
the GDP growth forecast in 2016 has been revised upwards by 
0.4  pp. This revision for the current year incorporates the more 
favourable course of activity in Q2, according to QNA results, 
compared with what had been anticipated in June. Moreover, the 
conjunctural information for the summer months suggests a more 
dynamic behaviour of activity in the second half of the year than 
was projected in the previous exercise. 
The growth envisaged for 2017 remains unchanged, which is the 
outcome of two opposing effects. As regards the technical 
assumptions, the less favourable outlook for the behaviour of 
export markets and, to a lesser extent, competitors’ lower prices 
and higher oil prices entail, overall, unfavourable consequences 
for activity which are offset only in part by the additional easing in 
financial conditions that private agents face. Further, this is not 
ultimately reflected in a lower average GDP growth rate for the 
coming year, as it is offset by a more favourable carryover effect 
for 2016.5 In 2018, the changes in the external assumptions exert, 
overall, a neutral impact on activity. 
The expansion in GDP throughout the projection period is 
explained by the buoyancy of national demand which, however, 
will tend to be less robust as from the coming year. Net external 
demand, whose contribution to GDP growth was negative in the 
period 2014-2015, will make an approximately neutral or slightly 
positive contribution over the time horizon envisaged. 
Among the components of national demand, household spending 
on goods and services will continue to show notable strength in 
the short term. Subsequently, the high rate of job creation will 
continue to underpin this spending component, although the 
disappearance of the effects of some temporary factors that have 
been supporting household income in the recent period (and 
which include, in particular, the decline in oil prices and the 
reductions in income tax that came into force in 2015) are expected 
to contribute to tempering the rate of increase of private 
consumption. As a result, following the projected increase of 3.4% 
this year, a slowdown to 2% in 2017 and to 1.5% in 2018 is 
expected. 
Favourable developments on the labour market and the 
persistence of benign financing conditions will prove conducive to 
the continuation of the course of recovery of residential investment. 
The increases in the pace of housing starts and house sales 
recently observed are along these lines. Notwithstanding the 
propitious context described, the intensity of the rise in this 
demand component will be checked by the prospect that the net 
household creation figures will be modest and, possibly, in some 
regions, by the high stock of unsold housing.
Business investment in capital goods will continue to expand at a 
high though diminishing rate, in step with the easing in the 
dynamism of final demand, in a setting in which financial conditions 
are expected to continue to be conducive to spending by non-
financial corporations. The slowdown under the heading of other 
construction, prompted for reasons similar to those described in 
the case of investment in equipment, will be mitigated by the 
assumption made that the level of the public investment 
components will stabilise in 2017, after the fall-off observed in 
2016. 
As regards exports, which have recently moved on a very 
favourable trajectory, the moderate dynamism of external markets 
(and, to a lesser extent, lower competitors’ prices) will give rise to 
somewhat more modest rates of increase. However, sales abroad 
are expected to continue showing a more expansionary course 
than the markets on which they are targeted, owing to the gains in 
competitiveness accumulated in the past (and which are not 
projected to continue in the future) and to the sustained increase 
in the number of firms which, having initiated export activity in a 
specific external market, remain present in such markets after 
several years. Furthermore, it is estimated that the tourism 
component will continue to be boosted by the political instability 
and the security problems in some of Spain’s Mediterranean 
competitors. The course of imports will be determined by the 
slowdown in the main components of final demand. 
On the estimates made, the surplus on the rest-of-the-world 
account may rise to 2.6% of GDP in 2016, 0.5 pp up on 2015, 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018) (cont’d)
5  The carryover effect denotes the arithmetic contribution that the quarter-
on-quarter growth rates of one year exert on the annual average growth 
rate of the following year. On this occasion, specifically, the estimated 
contribution of the quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in 2016 to the 
average growth of this variable in 2017 is now greater than was estimated 
in June. On one hand, as indicated, the behaviour of activity was more 
expansionary in 2016 Q2 than expected in June. Moreover, on the other 
hand, the present projections include an upward revision of expected 
growth in the final two quarters of this year. In mechanical terms, this 
gives a higher increase in GDP not only in 2016 but also in 2017.
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underpinned by the favourable trend of trade flows in real terms, 
the previous fall in oil prices and the lower net interest charge paid 
abroad. In subsequent years, the nation’s lending capacity may be 
expected to ease as a result of the higher level of oil prices. 
With regard to the labour market, the high pace of job generation 
is expected to persist, with low growth in apparent labour 
productivity, as is habitual in expansionary phases in the Spanish 
economy. The buoyancy of employment will be underpinned, 
moreover, by the projected continuation of wage moderation, 
which will contribute to the maintenance of modest though rising 
rates of increase in unit labour costs. The growth of employment 
will lead to further declines in the unemployment rate, which will 
be strengthened by a downward revision of the estimated growth 
of the labour force related to population ageing, as is set out in 
greater detail in Box 6.
Inflation, measured by the rate of change of consumer prices, has 
been rising since the spring, exhibiting increasingly less negative 
rates. This has essentially been the result of the increase in oil 
prices, although the indices that exclude the energy component – 
and, in particular, the index excluding unprocessed food and 
energy – have recently begun to show signs of picking up.
The CPI index excluding unprocessed food and energy is expected 
to continue quickening over the projection period, as a result of 
the prolongation of the period of expansion in spending on 
consumer goods, the gradual closing of the output gap and, 
towards the end of the projection horizon, the above-mentioned 
moderate rise in unit labour costs. As regards the energy 
component, and under the assumptions for the exercise, the 
recent quickening phase is projected to run into the coming 
months, with increasingly higher rates of change that will peak in 
spring 2017, slowing subsequently. 
As a result of the course of the various components, the overall 
indicator is expected to start posting increasingly positive rates as 
from September this year, which would nevertheless not prevent a 
fall-off of -0.3% being observed for 2016 on average. In 2017 and 
2018, respective increases of 1.5 % and 1.6 % are estimated, in a 
setting in which the overall effect of the changes in the assumptions 
on the inflation rate is slightly negative, which explains the 0.1 pp 
downward revision in 2018 with respect to the June projections. 
Chart 1 shows the year-on-year growth paths for GDP and for the 
CPI index excluding energy and unprocessed food under the 
baseline scenario, along with a measure of uncertainty surrounding 
these paths, constructed drawing on the past deviations of 
projections with respect to the figures actually observed. Under 
this approach, the probability that declines in GDP may be 
observed towards the end of the projection horizon would be 
around 10%, while the probability of the CPI index excluding 
unprocessed food and energy posting negative rates from now to 
end-2018 is very low according to the deviations in past 
projections. These probabilities have not undergone substantial 
changes from the June projections exercise. 
A limitation of this type of approach based on past forecasting 
deviations is that it ignores the possibility that, at a specific point 
in time, the perceived level of uncertainty may be higher than at 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018) (cont’d)
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
Latest figure: 2016 Q2 for GDP and August 2016 for the CPI excluding energy and unprocessed food prices.
a The right- and left-hand charts show the uncertainty around the central projection. Intervals with probabilities of 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 90%, respectively, 
based on historical projection errors.
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others, or that the risks may appear more likely in one direction 
than in the opposite direction. In this respect, in the present 
projections exercise it is considered that the risks surrounding the 
baseline scenario for GDP growth will, as in June, remain tilted to 
the downside. 
From the standpoint of the external environment, doubts remain in 
some emerging economies in particular concerning their ability to 
redress in an orderly fashion some of the imbalances observed. 
Moreover, in these projections it has been assumed that the 
impact on the baseline scenario of British voters’ decision to exit 
the EU will be manifest only through a downward revision of UK 
imports, meaning that the referendum outcome will not have direct 
adverse consequences on euro area agents’ confidence and 
spending decisions. However, it cannot be ruled out that, during the 
negotiation of the new trading arrangements between the United 
Kingdom and the EU, certain adverse effects of this type not 
envisaged in the baseline scenario may materialise. 
External risks also include a potential stepping up of global 
geopolitical tensions, which might harm both world trade and euro 
area agents’ confidence. In addition, the foreseeable tightening of 
monetary policy in the United States might exert certain adverse 
consequences on the net capital flows received by the most 
vulnerable emerging economies. Further, although the normalisation 
of financial conditions in the euro area in train since late 2012 
appears to be firmly embedded, this process might not be 
completely immune to any potential increase in the perception of 
risks to the banking sector in certain countries in the area. 
Conversely, it cannot be ruled out that the impact on activity of the 
set of monetary policy measures deployed by the ECB may be 
greater than envisaged in these projections, owing to possible 
delays in the transmission of some of them to real activity. 
Regarding domestic risks, the stability of GDP growth throughout 
the present exercise reflects the fact that the possible adverse 
effects arising from the prolongation of the current interim status 
of the government may have been offset during this period by 
other factors. Yet it cannot be ruled out that the adverse effects in 
question may ultimately materialise. In particular, the provisional 
nature of the central executive power has consequences for the 
budgetary process (as set out in Box 2) and, generally, for 
legislative activity, which may ultimately affect private agents’ 
confidence and, therefore, their consumption, investment and 
hiring decisions.
In the fiscal policy arena, the macroeconomic projections have, as 
indicated, been prepared on the basis of the absence of additional 
budgetary measures in the current exercise and under the 
assumption of a neutral fiscal policy stance in respect of activity 
during these years. Under these assumptions, the budget deficit is 
expected to exceed the fiscal targets agreed with the EU Council last 
August, thereby illustrating the need for fiscal policy to resume a 
restrictive stance in order to strengthen the sustainability of public 
finances and to ensure compliance with the targets. Any such 
additional budgetary consolidation measures could entail some cost 
in terms of growth over the course of the projection horizon. 
The extended delay in forming a Spanish government also affects 
the timing of the approval of the structural reforms needed to 
increase the economy’s potential growth. Any delay along these 
lines has adverse consequences for activity, since there are usually 
considerable lags between the adoption of the measures and the 
time at which such measures begin to have palpable effects. 
Conversely, the resilience recently demonstrated by the economy, 
despite the prevailing uncertainty surrounding economic policies 
and the materialisation of certain significant risks in the external 
environment, suggests that the dynamics of activity in our country 
retain a high degree of inertia which, should this hold for some 
time longer, might lessen the final incidence of the foregoing 
factors of risk. 
In terms of inflation, it is considered that the balance of risks is 
moderately tilted to the downside. In particular, the materialisation 
of any of the adverse events described affecting activity might give 
rise to a fresh disinflationary impulse, in particular under those 
scenarios in which external markets might perform less favourably, 
possibly accompanied by declines in commodities prices and an 
appreciation of the euro. Moreover, the recent situation of very low 
inflation rates might tend to be prolonged should agents 
extrapolate the trend observed to their expectations-formation 
process. Conversely, these risks would be alleviated if the 
expansionary monetary policy measures were to give rise to more 
buoyant consumer prices than was described under the baseline 
scenario. 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018) (cont’d)
